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CHARLES, et al. 
(doctors opposed to Illinois 
abortion regulations) -----, 
CA7 
[&Cj], Campbell [sdj]) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Appellants maintain that the C~ed in ho~gc2J 
provisions of the Ill Abortion Law unconstitutional and permanently 
enjoining their enforcement. 
FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: On Oct 30, 1979, the Ill General Assem-
bly amended the state's abortion law to provide for increased regula-
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tion of certain procedures. 
ll 
Sections 6(1) and 6(4) con9ern an attend-
ing physician's "standard of care" with respect to maintaining an 
aborted fetus' life: §§(2) (10) and ll(d) require any person prescrib-
7 
ing an "abortifacient" (any instrument or drug designed to cause fetal 
death) to inform the recipient. Violations of these provisions are 
criminal offenses. That same day, appellees, several doctors and an 
---~ --., 
abortion clinic, filed this §1983 suit in the DC NDill (Flaum, J.) 
------"-....- ""------~---.__.....,.___-
against appellants, the Ill Attorney General, a class of Ill State 
Attorneys, and several intervening doctors, alleging that the provi-
sions were unconstitutional and seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief. 
On Nov 16, 1979, th~re1iminari1y enjoin~d enforcement of 
§§6(1) and 6(4) because they incorporated a~nconstitutional defini-
---? ------
tion of viability: the DC refused to enjoin enforcement of §§2(10) and 
1~-;;;;;a1, th~ that §~) shou1d~so be 
enjoined because they forced physicians "to act as the mouthpiece for 
the State's theory of life." 627 F.2d 772, 789-790 (1980). 
-~
After another preliminary hearing before the DC, which is not 
part of this appeal, the DC (Kocoras, ,J.), in Oct 1983, was prepared 
to rule on cross-motions for summary judgment. At this point, the 3 
challenged laws provided as follows: 
(1) Sectio~, which imposes a standard of care on physicians 
who perform abortions on a "viable" fetus: 1 
1The Ill Abortion Law defines "viability" as "that stage 
of fetal development when, in the medical judgment of the 
attending physician based on the particular facts of the case 
before him, there is a reasonable likelihood of sustained 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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"No person who intentionally terminates a pregnane~ after the 
fetus is known to be viable shall intentionally fail to exer-
cise that degree of professio~ skill, care and diligence to 
preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person 
would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life 
and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted. 
Any physician or person assisting in such a pregnancy termina-
tion who shall intentionally fail to take such measures to 
encourage or to sustain the life of a fetus known to be via-
ble, before or after birth, commits a Class 2 ~elony if the 
death of a viable fetus or infant resurt:S from such failure." 
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, ,181-26, §6(1) (emphasis added). 
(2) Section 6(4), which imposes a similar standard of care on 
p~ysicians performing abortions on a possibly viable fetus: 
"No person who intentionally terminates a pregnancy shall in-
tentionally fail to exercise that degree of professional 
skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of 
the fetus which such person would be required to exercise in 
order to preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to 
be born and not aborted when there exists, in the medical 
judgment of the physician performing the pregnancy termination 
based on the particular facts of the case before him, a possi-
bility known to him of more than momentary survival of the 
fetus, apart from the body of the mother, with or without ar-
tificial support. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, ,181-26, §6(4) (em-
phasis added). 
(3) Sections 2(10) and ll(d), which define "abortifacient" and 
require a physician who prescribes an "abortifacient" method of birth 
control to inform his patient that he has done so: 
Section 2(10). "'Abortifacient' means any instrument, medi-
cine, drug or any other substance or device which is known to 
cause fetal death when employed in the usual and customary use 
ror which it is manufactured, whether or not the fetus is 
known to exist when such substance or device is employed." 
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, ,181-22, §2(10). 
Section ll(d). "Any person who sells any drug ••• which he 
knows to be an abortifacient and which is in fact an abortifa-
cient, unless upon prescription of a physician, is guilty of a 
Class B misdemeanor. Any person who prescribes or administers 
survival of the fetus outside the womb, with or without 
artificial support." Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, 1!81-22, §2(2). 
The law defines "fetus" as "a human being from fertilization 
untilbirth. Id., §2(9). 
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any instrument ••• which he knows to be an abortif ~cient, and 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fails to i h form the 
person for whom it is prescribed or upon whom it is adminis-
tered that it is an abortifacient commits a Class C misdemean-
or." Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, ,[81-31, §ll(d). 
The DC held that §6(1) was valid and declined to enjoin enforce-
ment of this provision. The court also held, however, that §§6(4), 
2(10), and ll(d), were unconstitutional and thus permanently enjoined 
their enforcement. 
For the first time before the CA7 at oral argument, appellants 
suggested that appellees' challenges to §§6(1) and 6(4) were moot giv-
en the legislature's June 1984 amendments. Sections 6(1) and 6(4) 
were amended to place more emphasis on the physician's medical judg-
ment.2 Apparently, these amended provisions are currently the subject 
of a temporary restraining order entered by the DC NDill in Keith v. 
Daley, No. 84 C 5602 (1984). For that reason the CA7 declined to rule 
2section 6(1), as amended, deletes the "known to be 
viable" proviso and expressly incorporates the definition of 
"viability" contained in §2(2): 
"Any physician who intentionally performs an abortion when, in 
his medical judgment based on the particular facts of the case 
before him, there is a reasonable likelihood of sustained 
survival of the fetus outside the womb with or without artificial 
support, shall utilize that method of abortion which, of those he 
knows to be available, is in his medical judgment most likely to 
preserve the life and health of the fetus." P.A. 83-1128, H.B. 
1399, §6(1). 
Section 6(4), as amended, follows suit, providing in 
pertinent part: 
"Any physician who intentionally performs an abortion when, in 
his medical judgment based on the particular . facts of the case 
before him, there is a reasonable possibility of sustained 
survival of the fetus outside the womb, with or without 
artificial support, shall utilize that method of abortion which, 
of those he knows to be available, is in his medical judgment 
most likely to preserve the life and health of the fetus. P.A. 
83-1128, H.B. 1399, §6(4). 
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on the validity of these provisions. 
The CA7 rejected appellants' suggestion of mootness and held that 
the 3 provisions at issue were unconstitutional. Accordingly, the 
court affirmed the DC's permanent injunction with respect to §6(4) 
§§2(10) and ll(d), and directed the DC to enter a permanent injunction 
of§6(1). 
did ate could still prosecute 
such as appellees, for violating the terms of that provision, which 
remained in effect from Oct 1983 to June 1984; §6(1) contained a 3-
year limitations period. The court reasoned that this possibility of 
prosecution constituted a live controversy within Article III. With 
respect to §6(4), the court observed that this provision had been sub-
ject to a continuous injunction since 1979. Hence, there was no pos-
sibility of prosecution. Nevertheless, the court held that the amend-
ment did not moot the case. Following the statement in City of Mes-
quite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 u.s. 282, 289, n. 10 (1982) , 3 the 
court concluded that appellants had failed to prove that the State 
will not "return to its old ways" if the court dismisses appellees' 
3 In City of Mesquite, the plaintiff contended that a 
municipal zoning ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. During 
the pendency of the plaintiff's appeal, the defendant City 
revised the ordinance and removed its objectionable language. 
The Court held that the revision did not moot the plaintiff's 
appeal, observing: 
"The test for mootness in cases such as this is a stringent one. 
Mere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not 
moot a case; if it did courts would be compelled to leave '[t]he 
defendant ••• free to return to his old ways.'" 455 u.s., at 
289, n. 10 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 
629, 632 (1953)). 
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claim. Moreover, appellants had not demonstrated 
effects" of §6(4) were eliminated by the recent amendment. 
2. Section~. Although the State's interest in preserving 
fetal life is co~ng at the stage of viability, the State may only 
----- -::z_ __ ___, 
regulate in such a context if it narrowly tailors its regulations to 
/ 
the precise interest at stake. Roe v. Wade, 410 u.s. 113, 163, 165 
(1973). Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979), makes clear 
that the State, in serving its compelling interest, must respect the j 
physician's ~'i4~~~9_:!;~n·~ in de;::'min 
ing how to carry out her abortion. In particular, the State may not 
interfere with the attending physician's medical judgment in determin-
ing the precise point in a woman's pregnancy at which viability ex-
ists. Id., at 395-396; accord, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 
u.s. 52, 64 (1976) ("the determination of whether a particular fetus1/)t!/utt. .. 
is~ ~ and must~ , a matter for the responsible at.:.,endin~y j,vu_ 
sician"). The court held §6(1) invalid because it does not specify 
that the attending physician's viability determination alone shall 
govern; in this respect, the provision "improperly encroaches on the~ 
attending physician's medical judgment in treating his patient." 749 
F. 2d, at 4 59. 
Moreover, the court observed that §6(1) fails to give physicians 
and their assistants explicit notice of the type of conduct the State~ 
purports to condemn. 
"Because [§6(1)] abuts upon a woman's fundamental right to 
consult her doctor about abortion and to receive the doctor's 
unimpeded medical judgment, it threatens to chill the exercise 
of her freedom. Specifically, the section encumbers the 
woman's exercise of a constitutionally protected right by 
placing obstacles in the form of criminal sanctions in the 
path of the doctor upon whom she is entitled to rely." Id., 
at 460. 
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Under the circumstances, the court concluded that §6(l) t is "unconsti-
tutionally vague." In a footnote, the court noted that the statute's 
amended definition of viability {§2(2)) did not remedy §6(1) 's impre-
cision because §6 (1) still fails to inform the physi~ian as to whose 
~ .._...,_. 
3. Section 6(4). 
1:/17 ~ 
Unlike §6(1), this provision purports to regu-
J\ 
late the performance of abortions at a stage before viability. This 
statute creates a direct interference with a woman's right to discuss -
.... ~ .,..- -- ............... ~ --....... =="\w:a ~ rt """' 
abortion with her physician and to receive her physician's unimpeded 
---------~ ~ 
medical judgment because of its criminal penalties. The court con-
eluded that the statute creates the distinct possibilty that the woman 
will be unable to exercise her right to choose abortion because her 
doctor refuses to perform an abortion at the risk of going to jail. 
Given this burden on the woman's right to have an abortion, the State 
~ must have a compelling interest and prove that it has written §6(4) to 
protect only that interest. The State's compelling interest in pre-
serving fetal life cannot justify §6(4) because that provision applied 
to certain pre-viability abortions. Similarly, the State's compelling 
interest in protecting the woman's health cannot save §6(4) because 
that provision penalizes hostile activity which is harmful to the 
fetus' health and does not in any manner seek to protect the mother's 
health. In light of the State's failure to present any other compel-
ling interest which could justify §6{4) 's restriction on a woman's 
------.-* 
freedom to choose an abortion, the court held that §6(4) unconstitu-
tionally infringes the woman's fundamental right. 
4. Sections 2(10) and ll(d). The Court in Roe v. Wade, and City 
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 
·. 
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2481 (1983), ruled that States ~!::_e ~ _f?W~ tq~..::erride the 
rights of a pregnant woman by adopting one theory of when life begins. 
City of Akron explictly prohibited the State from foisting upon the 
pregant woman its view that life begins at conception in order to jus-
tify its regulation of abortion. 103 s. Ct., at 2500. The court con-
eluded that §§2(10) and ll(d) constitute such an attempt by the State 
because the sections incorporate the definition of "fetus" in which 
_._ 
the State classifies a fetus as a human being from fertilization until • 
deatl1 • ......--
The court rejected appellants' argument that the sections do not 
at all require physicians to reiterate the State's theory that life 
begins at conception. 
"However physicians choose to comply with the mandate of sec-
tion ll(d), they nevertheless must notify their patients that 
the drug or device which they have prescribed will terminate 
the life of any fetus which their patients might be carrying. 
This section not only intrudes upon the medical discretion of 
the attending physician, but it also impermissibly imposes the 
State's theory of when life begins upon the physician's pa-
tient." 749 F.2d, at 462. 
The court concluded that the State's interest in protecting "rna-
ternal emotional and physical health" cannot justify §§2(10) and ll(d) 
because the sections impose on those women who prefer abortifacient 
methods of birth control the State's theory that abortifacients kill 
unborn children. "The State may not treat such women inequitably in 
order to protect the emotional health of women who oppose abortifa-
cients." Ibid. Also, the State's interest in preserving fetal life 
cannot justify these provisions: these provisions operate in situa-
tions where the woman is not pregnant: and when the woman is pregnant, 
the provisions impermissibly restrict the attending physician's dis-
cretion at a stage in the mother's pregnancy at which neither of the 
- 9 -
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State's recognized interests (preserving fetal life or ~rotecting the 
I 
mother's health) may be compelling. Finally, these provisions in-
fringe upon a constitutionally protected right to choose a method of 
contraception in a sitution where the State has no compelling counter-




Sections 2(10) and ll(d). Appellants contend that these provi-
sions, which merely seek to ensure that women are informed about abor-
tifacients, are fully consistent with the Court's guidelines in Dan-
forth and City of Akron. These cases hold that the State has the au-
thority to take steps to inform women about the nature and conse-
quences of abortion procedures. Appellants take issue with the CA7's 
reasoning that these provisions render physicians "mouthpieces" of the 
State. City of Akron held that only when the statute directs the doc-
tor to use specific words, as did the Akron ordinance at issue, can 
the use of those words be attributable to the State. Section ll(d), 
however, does not require the doctor to recite any specific litany; 
the statute simply requires the doctor to state the truth--that he is 
prescribing an abortifacient. Moreover, appellants disagree with the 
CA7's conclusion that the provisions somehow infringe a woman's right 
to decide to use contraceptives. The provisions' "plain meaning" en-
compasses only abortifacients (drugs or devices that prevent birth 
after fertilization), not contraceptives (drugs or devices that pre-
vent fertilization). Finally, appellants argue that the CA7's sugges-
tion that §ll(d) is unconstitutional because "it is somehow inequita-
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ble to require that women wishing to use abortifacient~ be hold that 
they are using them" is preposterous. Jur. St. 26. Sections 2(d) and 
ll(d) are designed to protect the fundamental rights of women who are 
opposed to abortion by allowing them to choose intelligently to re-
frain from using abortifacients. Thus, these provisions protect the 
women most likely to experience harm--those who unknowingly accept 
abortifacients and later learn what they thought was a contraceptive 
or other medication was in fact something they morally oppose. 
Mootness. Appellants claim that the 1984 amendments render any 
challenge to §6(1) moot, because these amendments substantially clari-
fy any vagueness in the law. The amended version of §6(1) specifies 
the physician's duty toward the fetus--to use the same skill, care and 
diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus to be aborted 
as would be required to preserve the life and health of a fetus in-
tenden to be born. In addition, the amendments, because of appellees' 
facial challenge, cure whatever "chilling effect" the unamended provi-
sions may have had. Similarly, the CA7 erred to believe that there 
was any reasonable possibility that the State would reenact the old 
provisions. Finally, the CA7 erred to hold that the possibility of 
prosecution for violating the unamended version of §6(1) established 
the necessary case or controversy. This conclusion has no basis in 
reality because the State has never sought to prosecute physicians on 
the basis of the prosecutor's "second-guessing" of their decisions. 
Validity of §6(1). Appellants contend that the CA7 ignored the 
canon of statutory construction that courts should interpret statutes 
to avoid declaring them unconstitutional. Section 6(1) may fairly be 
read as allowing only the attending physician's determination of via-
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' ' • , 
bility to control. 
' ( 'I 
With this construction, the prov1s1on is no longer 
vague and satisfies constitutional standards. This limiting construe-
tion was supported by the Ill Attorney General and State Attorney Da-
ley in briefs filed before the CA7. Under these circumstances, the 
CA7 clearly erred in adopting the more expansive reading of §6(1). 
Validity of §6(4). Appellants point out that the State has a 
legitimate interest in protecting fetal life. The only effect of 
§6(4) is to restrict hostile activity directed toward the fetus. In 
no circumstances does §6(4) place any obstacle on the decision whether 
or not to terminate the pregnancy. The woman remains free to consult 
with her physician and decide to terminate her pregnancy for whatever 
reason she and her physician decide upon. Appellants argue that 
"proper balancing" of the State's interest and the woman's right to 
privacy dictates that §6(4) be upheld. Roe v. Wade recognized the 
woman's right to decide to have an abortion. This right does not in-
elude the right to kill the fetus when there is a reasonable possibil-
ity that the fetus is capable of sustained survival outside the womb. 
The Court should review the issue presented by §6(4)--the extent of 
the State's authority to regulate abortions before the viability stage 
on behalf of the fetus in a manner that does not infringe upon a 
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. 
Appellees--
Sections 2(10) and ll(d). Appellees agree with the CA7 that 
these provisions may not stand in light of Danforth and City of Akron 
because they unconstitutionally intrude on the physician's medical 
discretion and force the physician to "foist upon" the patient the 
- 12 -
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State's view that life begins at conception. 
ll 
The State ' in these pro-
visions -is improperly attempting to influence the woman's 
constitutionaly protected right of private decisionmaking in matters 
relating to birth control by requiring physicians to inform all women 
that certain methods of birth control cause the death of an unborn 
child or human being. 
Mootness. For the reasons stated by the CA7, appellees agree 
that the 1984 amendments to §6(1) and §6(4) do not render the case 
moot. 
Validity of §6(1). The CA7, applying settled law, correctly con-
cluded that §6(1) was unconstitutional in light of its vagueness with 
respect to whether the physician's viability determination controlled. 
Appellants essentially concede the point, but then pull a "limiting 
construction" out of thin air. Contrary to appella~ts' suggestion, no 
limiting construction has been proffered by a state court or enforce-
ment agency. Appellants simply have borrowed an "argument" first 
raised in a reply brief to the CA7. 
Apart from this constitutional infirmity, §6(1) was properly 
struck down because it unnecessarily chills a physician's exercise of 
his medical judgment and thus indirectly inhibits a woman's exercise 
of her fundamental right to consult her doctor about abortion. In 
addition, §6(1) is not drafted with the precision necessary when the 
State imposes criminal penalties for a physician's handling of abor-
tion procedures. 
Validity of §6(4). In Colautti v. Franklin, 439 u.s. 379 (1979), 
the Court made clear that before viability a State may not impose di-
rect obstacles, such as criminal penalties, to further its interest in 
~ . '. 
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the potential life of the fetus. The CA7 simply follo ed this deci-
sion to strike down §6(4) because it effectively interferes with a 
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy at a stage where the State's 
interest is not compelling. 
Finally, appellees maintain that there is no need for the Court 
to set this case for full briefing and oral argument. The CA7's cor-
rect application of well-settled precedent should be summarily af-
firmed. 
DISCUSSION: Although the 1984 amendments perhaps lessen the sig-
nificance of the CA7's ruling, they do not appear to eliminate an Ar-
ticle III "case or controversy." Physicians may still be prosecuted 
for~), and the perceived "chilling effects" of the pro-~~ • 
vision continue. 
Turning to the merits, the Court's current bout with Thornbourgh 
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, No. 84-495 
(draft per curiam dismissing the appeal; circulated Jan 10, 1985), 
indicates that the Court does not welcome docketing another abortion 
case. I have little to add to the CA7's resolution of the issues in-
volved. Although the court chose to interpret §6(1) literally, so as 
not to have the physician's determination control, the court should 
not be faulted for reading the statute as loosely as it was drafted. 
The state legislature appears to have wanted to inject some uncertain-
ty into the field, and it is just this type of vagueness that this 
Court has consistently rejected. 
With respect to §6(4), I tend to think that the CA7 correctly 
recognized that the provision would inhibit a woman's ability to exer-
- 14 -
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cise her right to terminate her pregnancy under circumstances where 
the State's interest is not compelling. Perhaps the CA7 did not give 
sufficient weight to the State's interest in nurturing fetal life, but 
at the same time, the court recognized that the provision swept too 
broadly so as to infringe the woman's fundamental right to choose to 
terminate her pregnancy without any unnecessary obstacles from the 
State. 
Despite appellees' arguments, I cannot find much fault with the 
CA7's treatment of §§2(10) and ll(d). On the surface, it is difficult 
to argue with appellees' point that a woman should know ~ the drug 
she is taking will kill a fetus. On the other hand, the CA7 followed 
Danforth and City of Akron to conclude that these provisions placed 
physicians in the precarious position of carrying out the State's view 
of when life begins. ~nder the circumstances, the provisions effec-
tively interfered with the woman's right to choose a particular method 
of contraception and to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. 
Given the 1984 amendments, which substantially reduce the impor-
tance of the CA7's ruling, as well as the CA7's correct application of 
this Court's precedents to the specific provisions at issue, I recom-
mend that the Court affirm the CA7's judgment. 
I recommend affirm. 
There is a motion to dismiss or affirm. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell October 15, 1985 
From: Cabell 
No. 84-1379, Eugene F. Diamond & Jasper F. 
Williams v. Allan G. Charles, et al. 
On Appeal from CA7 
Argument: Tuesday, November 5, 1985 
Questions Presented 
1. Was there a justiciable case or controversy present 
in a facial challenge to sections 6(1) and 6(4) of the Illinois 
Abortion Law, when relevant statutory provisions had been amended 
and substantially altered? 
2. May Illinois require physicians who, prescribe or 
1 
administer abortifacients to inform their patients that they have 
done so? 
3. If the court of appeals did not err in addressing 
old section 6(1), did it nevertheless err in failing to adopt a 
saving interpretation? 
4. Can Illinois require the use of a method of abortion 
most likely to preserve the life of the fetus after the fetus has 
a reasonable possibility of survival? 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is a companion to No. 84-495, Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians. This memo omits or abbrevi-
ates discussion on those points covered in the bench memo for 
that case. 
1 
0 Appellants, Drs. Diamond and Williams (the latter now 
~lv deceased), appeal from the final judgment of the 7th Circuit 
~~ 'Court of Appeals holding sections 2(10), 6(1), 6(4), and ll(d) of 
V Q/' the Illinois Abortion Law unconstitutional. 
A~ On October 30, 1979, Appellees filed a complaint enjoin-
ing the enforcement of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 [sic], 
which had been passed that day by the General Assembly. Then-
District Judge Flaum enjoined the enforcement of sections 6 ( 1) 
and 6 (4) (duty of medical care toward "viable" fetus) because 
they incorporated an invalid definition of viability. He upheld 
sections 2 (10) and 11 (d) (duty to inform about abortifacient). 
The Court of Appeals reversed Judge Flaum's holdin1,9 on those lat-
1 
,1 
ter two sections. 1 
On remand, Judge Kocoras issued a permanent injunction 
against sections 2(10), ll(d), and 6(4), but upheld section 6(1) 
and dissolved the preliminary injunction that had been entered 
against it. Both sides appealed. our ing the pendency of that 
appeal, the Illinois legislature ~ded sec~~ an~ 
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the controversy con-
cerning old sections 6(1) and 6(4) was not moot because there was 
no assurance that the State would not "return to its old ways" 
and because the defendants had not "demonstrated that fthe amend-
ment] irrevocably eradicated the effects" of section 6 (4). The 
Court of Appeals then found both sections 6(1) and 6(4) unconsti-
tutional. The court also affirmed the permanent injunction 
against sections 2(10) and ll(d). 
This Court noted probable jurisdiction on May 20, 1985, 




Challenges to the ear 1 ier of sections 6 (l) 
I '' is still the threat of prosecution under ~~- not m~t because there 
~the ~r- P~.S'.Y is ~qn. 
tfJ -~ tion 6(4) is not moot because . the amendment did not materially uo (,tl'" 
Challenges to the earlier version of sec-
alter the alleged infirmities. On the merits, it appears that 
77 . 
~I (l) the Court of Appeals erred in holding unconstitutional the ( /11 
~ 
provision requiring that physicians inform their patients of the 
use of an abortifacient because of the substantial discretion 
~ 
"2o 
' . left to the physician; (2) the Court of Appeals <hd not err in 
I 
1'1 failing to adopt a strained saving interpretation of section 
6(1); and (3) section 6(4) intrudes on a patient's rights by re-
quiring the use of a method of abortion most likely to preserve 
fetal life when the fetus is only potentially viable. 
A. Mootness of Challenges to Sections 6(1) and 6(4) 
The appellants contend that although there is a 
justicable case or controversy with respect to amended sections 
6(1) and 6(4), the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing the 
unamended provisions. Relying on County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 
440 u.s. 625, 631 (1979), appellants argue that the voluntary 
cessation of the illegal conduct does dispel the controversy with 
respect to the unamended provisions because " ( 1) it can be said 
with assurance that 'there is no reasonable expectation ••• ' that 
the alleged violation will recur, and (2) interim relief or 
events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effect of 
the alleged violation." 
While I believe, unlike the Court of Appeals, that it is 
unlikely that the General Assembly will re-enact the old provi-
sion that it recently amended, the controversy with respect to 
these old sections is not moot. As the Court of Appeals found, 
the defendants offered no evidence to rebut the possibility of 
"" 6(1) that occurred with such prosecution for violations of "~old -1;-L ..)::he section was in effect. 
~~~ 
This ground is certainly sufficient 
yr· to support a review of the old 6(1). The controversy with re-
spect to old section 6(4) still exists because, as appellant con-
cedes, new section 6(4) contains the same provisions found to e 
~-
constitutionally repugnant. The constitutional iviolation has 
________.__, I ,) 
recurred~ the defendants have therefore failed to keet the first 
part of the Davis test and the controversy regarding section 6(4) 
is not moot. 
B. Abortifacient Requirements of Sections ll(d) and 2(10) 
Section 2(10) defines abortifacient. Section ll(d) re-
quires physicians who administer or prescribe abortifacients to 
inform their patients that they are doing so. The Court of Ap-
peals found that the requirement constituted an attempt to 
"foist[] upon the pregnant woman its view that life begins at 
conception." The court also held that the provision "not only 
intrudes upon the medical discretion of the attending physician, 
but it also impermissibly imposes the State's theory of when life 
begins upon the physician • s patient." Inexplicably, the court 
~ 
read t_A> statute to require physicians to inform their patients ? ..... ~.-..._.. -._..... 
t~ "abortifacients cause the death of unborn children." 
This Court's opinion in Danforth, as elaborated upon in 
Akron, construed "informed consent" to mean "the giving of infor-
mation to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its 
consequences." Akron, 462 u.s., at 447. Here, such information --is particularly important. ~l ,, ........ ... There is widespread public confusion ~£ 1• 
H "'\ ~ f ' ' 
over the distinction b~~n contracepti_y es and abortifacients. - ~--- -
There is a broad pharmacological overlap between them (widely 7 
prescribed "contraceptives" also act as abortifacients). Some 
women have an understandable wish to avoid fertilization but at ~ 
the same time would allow any fertilized egg to progress towards 
full term without interference. I believe that the distinction 
t>. 
I 
between an abortifacient and a contraceptive is an 'iimportant one, 
and that the state's justifiable effort to ensure ~'l at consent to 
------~ ------------------------------------treatment in which an abortifacient might be used supports these 
sections. 
Moreover, section 11 (d) does not require the physician 
to use any particular language or term to describe the "abortifa-
cient." The physician has broad discretion - to 
~
determine the manner of disclosure. The provision "properly t Lt::-
leaves the precise nature and amount of this disclosure to the 
~11 
physician's discretion and 'medical judgment."' Akron, supra, at 0\, 
447. Unlike the informed consent provisions invalidated in Ak-~ 
ron, see id., at 444-445, these sections merely ensure awareness 
of a decision about abortion itself, without touching upon the 
"significance" of that decision. 
The appellee • s argument that the Court • s informed con-
sent decisions should extend only to pregnant women because only 
pregnant wo~en were at issue in Danforth and Akron is without 
merit. It is a proper use of a state's regulatory police powers 
to require disclosure of the effects of an abortifacient, even if 
labelled "contraceptive," before prescribing the substance to a 
woman. Such provisions do not "run afoul" of the First Amendment 
more than any other disclosure provisions that have been approved 
by the Court. Nor do they promote the State • s theory of 1 i fe 
(the physician is not required to use the term "unborn child," 
"fetus," or any other such term). Although the preamble to the 
statute contains a "reaffirmation of the long-standing policy of 
this State, that the unborn child is a human being from the time 
.. 
of conception," this is no reason to overturn an b~herwise valid 
statutory provision. Finally, the traditional in i ormed consent 
doctrines do not alleviate this problem because they apply only 
to intrusive medical procedures. 
c. The Court of Appeals' Failure To Adopt a "Saving" Inter-
pretation of Section 6(1) and Its Unconstitutionality 
Section 6(1) makes it a felony for a physician to fail 
to use the same care in aborting a viable fetus that the physi-
cian would be required to use in bringing a viable fetus to live 
birth. Section 6(1) applies when the fetus is "known to be via-
ble," but does not specify whether the physician is to make this 
determination of viability. (The 1984 amendment to section 6(1) 
made the physician's opinion controlling.) 
The appellants argue that the court of appeals should 
have read the statute as allowing the physician's determination 
to control. Since September 1983, the term "viability" has been 
defined in section 2 of the act as being determined by "the medi-
cal judgment of the attending physician." 
------~~...-
This definition of 
1 
viability is i ~~ t~9_:f ~ni t_ion u~El).d in Dan-
forth. See 428 u.s., at 64. The court of appeals dismissed this 
reading in a footnote (no. 5) with the argument that the provi-
sian was not constitutional on its face: "section 6(1) still 
I fails to inform the physician controls." as to whose viability determination 
Section 2 's definition of "viable" should not be read 
into section 6(1) because of the construction of section 6 as a 
..... 
whole. Section 6 (4) tracks the language of section 6 (1) except 




is controlling. An implied incorporation of the section 2 defi-
nition of viability in section 6(1) would make section 6(1) iden-
tical to section 6(4) and render 6(4) surplusage. 
As the Court of Appeals recognized, the unamended stat-
ute did not state Uhose determination of viability~ was to be con-
~
elusive, and the State therefore had not precisely informed phy-- · ·-- --sicians of the prohibited conduct. The court then held that the 
- ·- ··--------... ....... _. 
vagueness of section 6(1) threatened to chill the exercise of the 
physician's best medical judgment and thereby chill the exercise 
of the woman's fundamental right to consult her doctor about 
abortion and to receive her doctor's unimpeded medical judgment. 
I agree that the section is unconstitutional without the amend-
ment. This Court has repeatedly held that "the determination of 
whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be a matter for 
the judgment of the responsible attending physician." Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 u.s. 52, 64 (1976). 
The Illinois legislature has subsequently amended sec-
tion 6(1) to ~ xpres'si1\ incorporat~ the definition of viability 
contained in section 1. 
D. Method of Abortion Most Likely To Allow Fetal Survival 
Section 6 (4) imposes a standard of care similar to that 
of section 6 ( 1) when 
possibly viable fetus. 
the physicians 
Under section ---
per forms an abortion on a 
6(4) . ~ji~a Cla~elo-
ny to fail to observe the same standard of care in aborting a 
_____---v 
possibly viable fetus that the medical team would be required to 
observe in bringing that fetus to a live birth. The section has 




challenge to its constitutionality in 1979. The court of appeals 
found that the section chilled a physician's exercise of unimped-
-· ~ .-....._ ___....__. .--...._-
ed judgment for fear ot" crimin.alSanctions. Although I do not 
~~ --..._ '-- ~;? 
believe that this statute is going to "impede" a physician's 
judgment, I do believe that it impermissibly interfers with the 
physician-patient relationship. The fear of criminal sanct i ons 
might cause a physician to decline to perform an abortion, or to 
compromise the care provided to the mother as he attempts to save 
the fetus facing immediate and grave danger. 
Only a compelling state interest would justify such in-
terference in the woman's exercise of her right to an abortion. 
As Ashcroft noted, the State has a "compelling interest in pro-
----------
tecting the lives of viable fetuses." 462 u.s., at 486. That 
interest will not justify intervention here, however, because the 
fetus is only potentially viable. Nor will the State's compel-
ling interest in the health of the mother, outlined in Akron, 
justify this interference because the statute does not seek to 
protect the health of the mother. The State has presented no 
other compelling interest, and therefore the statute is unconsti-
tutional. 
E. Problems in Standing 
For the first time, the appellees in their reply brief 
challenge the standing of Diamond and Williams to litigate these 
issues on behalf of the state. According to appellees, the state 
adopted appellants • brief before the Circuit Court. The State 
has not, however, explicitly taken such a position here. The 






Court states: nThe Illinois Attorney General's interest in this 
proceeding is identical to that advanced by it , in the lower 
courts and is essentially coterminous with the position on the 
issues set forth by the appellants.n 
I believe that because the State adopted the brief of 
Diamond and Williams below, the description of the State's inter-
est as nidentical to that advanced by it in the lower courts" is 
sufficient to allow appellants to claim that they litigate for 
the state. Certainly the State cannot reasonably be seen as 
withdrawing from the litigation. I would therefore treat the 
gauzy letter to the clerk as an adoption of appellants' brief. 
Moreover, under Supreme Court Rule 10.4, nAll parites to 
the proceeding in the court from whose judgment the appeals is 
being taken shall be deemed parties in this Court, unless the 
appellant shall notify the Clerk of this Court in writing 
that one or more of the parties below has no interest in the out-
come of the appeal.n 
III. CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals has three hits, two runs, one 
error. ---- Mootness. The threat of prosecution is sufficient to 
allow the challenge against 6 ( 1) to continue: the challenge to 
6(4) survives because the amendments did not alter the constitu-
tional infirmities. The judgment of the Court of Appeals should 






Notice of Abortifacient -- Sections 2(10) · & ll(d). The 
Illinois provision merely required disclosure of the existence of _.... 
the potential abortion. 
~
It had no required disclosure about the 
significance of the decision to terminate pregnancy. It gave the 
doctor broad discretion . It addressed an area of substantial 
..._______ --- . .., 
confusion among patients. The Court of Appeals' holding on sec-
tions 2(10) and ll(d) should be reversed. 
Saving Interpretation. The court of appeals reached the 
same result through a different route, but ~ refusal to adopt 
the saving interpretation is logical in light of the entire sec-
tion 6. Affirm here. Unamended section 6(1) is unconstitutional 
~
because it does not allow the attending physician's determination 
of viability to control. Affirm here, too. 
Duty of Care in Section 6(4}. The imposition of a duty 
of care on physicians regarding potentially viable fetuses over-
extends the State's compelling interest in preserving fetal life 
and impermissibly compromises the quality of care afforded the 
primary patient. 
Chinnis October 15, 1985 
•. 
: ~,· ,, 
October 22, 1985 
DIAMOND GINA-POW 
84-1379 DIAMOND v. CHARLES(CA7) (Set for November Sl 
MEMO TO FILE 
The purpose of this is to aid my memory with respect 
to the pertinent sections of the Illinois abortion laws, 
and briefly to state what CA7 held. 
tection 6 (1): Imposes a standard of care on 
J;tlysicians who perform abortions on a "viable fetus". 
This provision is miserably drafted and difficult to 
understand. CA7, correctly I am inclined to think, held 
the statute void for vagueness. It provides in summary 
(and I paraphrase): 
"A person (physician) who terminates the 
pregnancy after the fetus is k~ t9 be viable 
shall exercise that degree of professional sk f ll 
to preserve the life of the fetus as such 
physician would be required to exercise to 
perserve the life and health of a fetus not 
aborted and was to be born". 
The section makes violation a "class two felony if the 
death of a viable fetus or infant results from such 
failure". CA7, in addition to finding vagueness, 
invalidated the statute for the following reasons. 
,,·•,. 
2. 
' ' :, 
l'j 
I 
Section 6(1) applies when the fetus is "known to be 
viable", but provides no standard for determining 
viability. Thus, the section could make a physician's 
conduct a crime if he failed to observe appropriate 
standards of care in situations where some other physician 
reasonably believed that the fetus was viable. Although 
the Court of Appeals recognized the state's compelling 
interest in preserving fetal life after viability, it 
found that this section inter fer red with the exercise of 
medical judgment by the attending physician. In Danforth 
we held that the "determination of whether a particular 
fetus is viable is a matter for the responsible attending 
physician". (See Juris. St. A26-29. 
Section 6(4): In another poorly drawn provision, Section 
6(4) imposes a similarly vague standard of care on a 
physician who performs an abortion when there exists, in 
the medical judgment of the physician a possibi 1 iy 
known to him of more than momentary survival of the fetus, 
apart from the body of the mother." Thus, a physician 
would commit a class three felony if he failed to observe 
the same standard of care in aborting a possibly viable 
,/ 
3. 
fetus that he would be required (under Section 6 (1} to 
observe in bringing a viable fetus to live birth". Unlike 
Section 6(1}, Section 6(4} regulates not only the abortion 
of a viable fetus, but also the abortion of a fetus that 
is potentially viable. CA7 concluded that Section 6 (4) 
regulates the performance of "abortions that is staged 
p:-ior to viability", despite the holding in Roe v. Wade 
fuat the state's interest in perserving fetal life is not 
compelling prior to viability. Section 6 ( 4) creates a 
direct interference with a woman's right to discuss 
abortion with a physician and receive a physician's 
umimpeded medical judgement. The section places obstacles 
in the form of criminal sanctions in the path of the 
physican upon whom the woman is entitled to rely for 
advice. In so finding, CA7 cited the DC's opinion in 
Akron. See Juris. St. A. 32, 35. In addition, CA7 found 
that the woman may be unable to exercise her privacy right 
because her doctor refuses to perform an abortion at the 
risk of a criminal sanction. This possibility, CA7 held, 
"significantly burdens a woman •s right to terminate her 
pregnancy." 
~ctions 2(10) and ll(d): Section 2(10) defines the term 




W~k-i ~~4£-w.f (tf,s~)~'~~~·~~~ 
~ •' ~ ,;...~  ~c~ ~~~~ 
devise which is known to cause fetal death when employed 
------------~ 
in the customary use for which is manufactured, whether or 
not the fetus is known to exist". 
Section 11 (d) requires that physicians who prescribe 
or administer abortifacients inform their patients that 
they have done so, and a physician who knowingly fails to 
informs his patient is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
These sections deal with artificial means of birth 
control, and Sect ion 2 ( 10) refers to abortifacients as 
instruments, medicine or devise "known to cause fetal 
<Eath n. In effect, as I understand this, the physician 
must inform the woman for whom he or she prescribes a 
birth control device that it is "known to cause fetal 
death when employed in the usual and customary manner". 
ln both Roe and Akron, the Court held that states do 
rot have the power to override the right of a pregnant 
woman by adopting one theory of when life begins. In 
Danforth, we agreed that the state may require the 
providing of sufficient information for "informed consent" 
- i.e. that the physic ian should inform the woman as to 
what will be done (if an abortion is performed) and its 
possible consequences". See 428 u.s. 52, 67 n a. In 




requirement that the physician must recite a lengthy and 
mflexible list of information as to what might happen to 
the patient. we also held that the state could not 
mtrude upon the discretion of the pregnant woman's 
physician with respect to the medical advice that should 
be given. 
In this case, the serious flaw - at least so it seems 
to me now - is that the required information may include 
the substance of the statutory definition of 
abortifacient, namely, that the instrument device or 
~
oobstance is one "known to cause fetal death". Thus, the 
Illinois statute adopts the view of the anti-abortionist 
that life begins with conception. The statute does not 
quite say this, but describing the result as "fetal death" 
certainly implies it. CA7 construed the definition as 
-~
incorporating the "state's theory that life begins at 
conception", rejecting the contrary argument that these 
sections "merely require that the physicians notify their 
patients that they are prescribing abortifacients, and not 
that they will kill their patient's unborn children. 
The foregoing is an incomplete summary of the 
statutes at issue, and in conclusory terms the 
6. 
reasoning of CA7 in invalidating them. I will be 
J;articularly interested in Cabell's view as to whether 
these sections violate prior decisions of this Court. I 
have not yet read his bench memo. 
lppellant's brief - fairly well written - emphasizes 
the state police power to regulate abortions pursuant to 
the compelling state interest in maternal and fetal 
health. The brief makes a lawyer like effort to support 
the Illinois regulations on the ground that they do not 
violate prior cases. 
With respect to Sections 2(10) and ll(d), appellant's 
brief states that "abortifacients do not prevent 
fertilization and are not contraceptives since they 
operate after fertilization has taken place. The opinion 
of CA7 is criticized for referring to drugs and devices 
that induce abortion at early stages of pregnancy as 
"contraceptives". This is said to be "inaccurate and 
misleading", as a contraceptive is an artificial means of 
preventing fertilization of the human ovum", while 
abortifacients do not prevent fertilization and are means 
of abortion after fertilization has taken place. It is 
7. 
argued reasonably, I think, that the state is entitled to 
require disclosure of the difference the state makes. 
LFP, JR. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1379 
EUGENE F. DIAMOND AND JASPER F. WILLIAMS, 
APPELLANTS v. ALLAN G. CHARLES ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1986] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Appellant Eugene F. Diamond is a pediatrician engaged in 
private practice in Illinois. He seeks to defend before this 
Court the constitutionality of four sections of the Illinois 
Abortion Law of 1975, as amended. 1 These sections impose 
criminal liability for the performance of an abortion under 
certain circumstances, and, under other circumstances, re-
quire that the woman be provided with particular abortion-
related information. The State of Illinois has chosen to ab-
sent itself from this appeal, despite the fact that its statute is 
at stake. Because a private party whose own conduct is nei-
ther implicated nor threatened by a criminal statute has no 
judicially cognizable interest in the statute's defense, we dis-
miss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. ....____ 
I 
On October 30, 1979, over gubernatorial veto, the Illinois 
Legislature amended the State's 1975 abortion law to provide 
for increased regulation. 1979 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 81-1078. 
That very day appellees, four physicians who provide obstet-
1 1975 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 79-1126, as amended, now codified as Ill. Rev. 
Stat. ch. 38, ~~ 81-21 to 81-34 (1983). The 1975 Act was passed over the 
Governor's veto. Substantial portions of it already have been ruled to be 
unconstitutional. See, e. g. , Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (ND Ill. 





2 DIAMOND v. CHARLES 
ric, gynecologic, and abortion services in Illinois, filed a class 
action in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois. They alleged a deprivation of rights in 
violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 by the Illinois officials charged 
with enforcing the Abortion Law.2 Appellees sought de-
claratory and injunctive relief. 3 
The next day, the District Court certified the plaintiff class 
and temporarily restrained enforcement of the entire statute. 
On November 8, appellant Diamond filed a motion to inter-
vene as a party defendant, either permissively or as of right, 
and to be appointed guardian ad litem for infants who survive 
abortion. 4 The motion for intervention professed to be 
based on Doctor Diamond's conscientious objection to abor-
tions, and on his status as a pediatrician and as a parent of an 
unemancipated minor daughter. 5 
2 The defendants named in the complaint were the Attorney General of 
the State and the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Health, each 
in his official capacity, and the State's Attorney of Cook County, in both his 
official capacity and as representative of a class consisting of the State's 
Attorneys in all the counties of the State of Illinois. A suit against a state 
officer in his official capacity is, of course, a suit against the State. See 
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. --, -- (1985) (slip op. 6). The Dis-
trict Court certified a defendant class of State's Attorneys. Charles v. 
Carey, Civ. No. 79C 4541 (ND Ill., Oct. 31, 1979). 
8 On the same day another and similar action was filed in the same court 
by three other Illinois obstetrician-gynecologists and two Illinois clinics 
that provide abortion services. The two suits were consolidated by court 
order on Nov. 14, 1979. 
• Doctor Diamond's Motion to Intervene and for Appointment of Guard-
ian was joined by Doctor Jasper F. Williams, and David K. Campbell. 
Doctor Williams, a physician engaged in private practice in Illinois, in the 
alternative sought appointment as guardian ad litem for unborn children 
subject to abortion. We are advised that Doctor Williams died on April 
15, 1985, after the filing of the notice of appeal to this Court. No one has 
been substituted for him. Mr. Campbell, who sought intervention as the 
spouse of a woman of childbearing age, did not file or join a notice of appeal 
to this Court. 
5 Diamond claimed that under the Abortion Law as a whole fewer abor-
tions would be performed, and that those performed in accordance with the 
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Over appellees' objection, the District Court granted Dia-
mond's motion to intervene. 6 The District Court did not in-
dicate whether the intervention was permissive or as of right 
and it did not describe how Diamond's interests in the litiga-
tion satisfied the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 24 for 
intervenor status. The court denied the guardianship 
motion. 
On November 16, the District Court entered a preliminary 
injunction against a number of sections of the Abortion Law, 
including §§ 6(1) and 6(4). 7 These sections prescribe the 
standard of care that must be exercised by a physician in per-
forming an abortion of a viable fetus, 8 and of a possibly viable 
Abortion Law would be designed to preserve the life of aborted fetuses, 
resulting in more live births. Diamond also rested his motion for interven-
tion on § 13 of the Abortion Law, which provides that a physician who 
refuses to perform abortions based on conscientious objections will not be 
subject to liability. He relied, furthermore, on § ll(a), to the effect that 
violations of the Abortion Law constitute unprofessional conduct, and on 
§ 3.3, which provides for parental consultation. 
6 Although the Motion to Intervene was on behalf of Doctor Diamond, 
Doctor Williams, and Mr. Campbell, see n. 4, supra, the District Court 
granted leave to intervene to Americans United for Life Legal Defense 
Fund, counsel for the intervenors below, and for Diamond before this 
Court. 
7 The preliminary injunction also applied to the following sections: § 2(2) 
(defining "viability"); § 3.3 (parental consultation); § 3.4 (spousal consulta-
tion); § 3.5(2), in part (the portion requiring that the patient be told, inter 
alia, that "The State of Illinois wants you to know that in its view the child 
you are carrying is a living human being whose life should be preserved. 
Illinois strongly encourages you not to have an abortion but to go through 
to childbirth"); § 4 (abortion subsequent to first trimester); §§ 5(1), (2), and 
(3) (definition of "viability"); § 9 (prohibition of saline amniocentesis after 
first trimester); § 10(i) (certification as to nonviability or as to medical indi-
cators for abortion when fetus was viable); § 10(j) (reporting requirements 
for saline amniocentesis); § lO(l), in part (the reporting requirement as to 
the basis for a judgment concerning the existence of a medical emergency); 
and § 12, in part (the third sentence, prohibiting experimentation with or 
exploitation of fetal tissue). 
8 6(1) then provided: 
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fetus. 9 A violator of § 6(1) is subject to a term of imprison-
ment of between three and seven years and a fine not exceed-
ing $10,000. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ~~ 1005-8-1(5) and 
1005-9-1(1) (1983). A violator of§ 6(4) is subject to a term of 
imprisonment of between two and five years and a fine not 
exceeding $10,000. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ~~ 1005-8-1(6) 
and 1005-9-1(1) (1983). 
"No person who intentionally terminates a pregnancy after the fetus is 
known to be viable shall intentionally fail to exercise that degree of profes-
sional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus 
which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the 
life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted. Any phy-
sician or person assisting in such a pregnancy termination who shall inten-
tionally fail to take such measures to encourage or to sustain the life of a 
fetus known to be viable before or after birth commits a Class 2 felony if 
the death of a viable fetus or infant results from such failure." Ill. Rev. 
Stat., ch. 38, ~ 81-26 (1983). 
On June 30, 1984, the Illinois Legislature amended § 6(1), overriding an-
other veto of the Governor. 1984 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 83-1128, § 1. The 
Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of § 6(1) as it appeared 
prior to the 1984 amendment. See Charles v. Daley, 749 F. 2d 452, 455 
(CA7 1984). 
9 Section 6(4) then provided: 
"No person who intentionally terminates a pregnancy shall intentionally 
fail to exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to pre-
serve the life and health of the fetus which such person would be required 
to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to 
be born and not aborted when there exists, in the medical judgment of the 
physician performing the pregnancy termination based on the particular 
facts of the case before him, a possibility known to him of sustained sur-
vival of the fetus apart from the body of the mother, with or without artifi-
cial support. Any physician or person assisting in such pregnancy termi-
nation who shall intentionally fail to take such measures to encourage or 
sustain the life of such a fetus, before or after birth, is guilty of a Class 3 
felony if the death of a viable fetus or an infant results from such failure." 
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ~ 81-26 (1983). 
Section 6(4) was amended by the 1984 statute cited in n. 8, supra, but the 
Court of Appeals assessed its constitutionality, also, on the version quoted 
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The plaintiffs appealed the denial of the preliminary injunc-
tion as to § 2(10), which defines the term "abortifacient," 10 
and as to § ll(d), which requires a physician who prescribes 
an abortifacient to tell the patient what it is. 11 A violator of 
§ ll(d) is subject to a term of imprisonment of not more than 
30 days, and a fine not exceeding $500. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 
38, ~~ 1005-8-3(1) and 1005-9-1(3) (1983). No cross-appeal 
was taken. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in-
structed the District Court to enter a preliminary injunctio 
as to §§ 2(10) and ll(d), because these statutory provision 
forced physicians "to act as the mouthpiece for the State' 
theory of life." Charles v. Carey, 627 F. 2d 772, 789 (1980). 12 
On remand, the District Court permanently enjoined,1 
among others, §§6(4), 2(10), and ll(d). Charles v. Carey, 
579 F. Supp. 464 (ND Ill. 1983). 13 On appeal and cross-ap-
10 Section 2(10) provides: 
"'Abortifacient' means any instrument, medicine, drug, or any other 
substance or device which is known to cause fetal death when employed in 
the usual and customary use for which it is manufactured, whether or not 
the fetus is known to exist when such substance or device is employed." 
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, 1!81-22 (1983). 
11 Section ll(d) provides in relevant part: 
"Any person who prescribes or administers any instrument, medicine, 
drug or other substance or device, which he knows to be an abortifacient, 
and which is in fact an abortifacient, and intentionally, knowingly or reck-
lessly fails to inform the person for whom it is prescribed or upon whom it 
is administered that it is an abortifacient commits a Class C misdemeanor." 
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, 1!81-31 (1983). 
12 The Court of Appeals instructed the District Court also to enter a pre-
liminary injunction against the following sections: § 3.2(A)(1)(a)(iii); 
§ 3.5(2); § 6(6); § 3.2(A)(l)(a) (defining the terms "by the physician who is to 
perform the abortion" and "the woman is provided at least 24 hours before 
the abortion"); § 3.2(A)(1)(b) (defining the term "from the physician at least 
24 hours before the abortion is to be performed"); § 3.2(B)(1) (waiver of 
waiting period); § 10(k) (reporting requirement for waiver of the waiting 
period);§ 3.2(A)(l)(a) (defining the term "with a true copy of her pregnancy 
test results"); and § 6(2). See 627 F. 2d, at 792, and n. 36. 
13 Other sections of the Abortion Law had been preliminarily enjoined 
--
~-~ . ,. , 
•·. 
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peal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the entry of the perma-
nent injunction as to the three sections, and also permanently 
enjoined §6(1). 749 F. 2d 452 (CA7 1984). The State did 
not appeal the grant of the permanent injunction. Diamond, 
however, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and a jurisdic-
tional statement. As we have indicated, see n. 4, supra, Dr. 
Diamond is the sole appellant here. We noted probable ju-
risdiction. --U.S.-- (1985). I 
The State, through the office ofjts Attorney-:peneryl, sub-
sequently filed with this Court-a "letter of interest," invoking 
our Rule 10.4, which provides: "All parties to the proceeding 
in the court from whose jud-ginent the appeal is being taken 
shall be deemed parties in this Court . . . . " In that letter 
Illinois stated: 
"Although not an appellant, the Office of the Attorney 
General ... is a party in the United States Supreme 
Court and is designated an appellee. The Illinois Attor-
ney General's interest in this proceeding is identical to 
that advanced by it in the lower courts and is essentially 
co-terminous with the position on the issues set forth by 
the appellants." Letter dated July 15, 1985, to the 
Clerk of the Court from the Director of Advocacy, Office 
of the Attorney General of Illinois. See App. to Reply 
Brief for Appellants A-1. 
Illinois' absence as an appellant requires that we examine oyr 
jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. -
----------
Article III of the Constitution limits the power of federal 
courts to deciding "cases" and "controversies." This re-
quirement ensures the presence of the "concrete adverseness 
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the 
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitu-
under a separate opinion by the District Court following remand. See 
Charles v. Carey, 579 F. Supp. 377 (ND Ill. 1983). 
,. 
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tional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). 
The presence of a disagreement, however sharp and acrimo-
nious it may be, is insufficient by itself to meet Art. III's re-
quirements. This Court consistently has required, in addi-
tion, that the party seeking judicial resolution of a dispute 
"show that he personally has suffered some actual or threat-
ened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of 
the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 
441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 
490, 501 (1975). 
In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United 
for Separation of Church and State, 454 U. S. 464, 473 
(1982), the Court observed: "The exercise of judicial power 
... can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property 
of those to whom it extends" that the decision to seek review 
must be placed "in the hands of those who have a direct stake 
in the outcome." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 
(1972). It is not to be placed in the hands of "concerned by-
standers." United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 687 
(1973). 
III 
Had the State of Illinois invoked this Court's appellate ju-
risdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2) and sought review of 
the Court of Appeals' decision, the "case" or "controversy" 
requirement would have been met, for a State has standing 
to defend the constitutionality of its statute. Diamond ar-
gues that Illinois' "letter of interest" demonstrates the 
State's continued concern with the enforcement of its Abor-
tion Law, and renders the State the functional equivalent of 
an appellant. Accordingly, Diamond asserts, there is no ju-
risdictional problem in the case. This claim must be 
rejected. 
It is true that, as a party below, the State remains a party_ 
h~':_~~~l.!l" Rule 10.:4 '4 But statuSiiS a "party" does not 
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' I 
' 
equate with status as an appellant. To appear before the 
Court as an appellant, a party must file a notice of a peal, the 
statutory prerequisite to mvoking is ourt's jurisdiction. 
See 2 . § I mois mere expression of interest 
is insufficient to bring the State into the suit as an appellant. 
By not appealing the judgment below, the State indicated its 
acceptance of that decision, and its lack of interest in defend-
ing its own statute. 16 The State's general interest may be 
adverse to the interests of appellees, but its failure to invoke 
our jurisdiction leaves the Court without a "case" or "contro-
versy" between appellees and the State of Illinois. Cf. 
Princeton University v. Schmid, 455 U. S. 100 (1982). 
Had the State sought review, this Court's Rule 10.4 makes 
clear that Diamond, as an intervening defendant below, also 
----~ 
was not notified that this Court's review has been sought by another party, 
to make its interests known to the Court. Frequently, an appellant would 
seek review as to only one party below, permitting the judgment to stand 
as to others. See R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice, 
§ 6-20 (5th ed. 1978), and § 6.35 (3d ed. 1962) (describing evolution of the 
Rule). This Court's Rule 10.4 therefore avoids the adjudication of rights 
in a party's absence, but it does not provide a means to obtain review when 
there has been no filing by that party of a notice of appeal. 
1
& 28 U. S. C. § 2107 provides that, with specified exceptions, "no appeal 
shall bring any judgment, order or decree in an action, suit or proceeding 
of a civil nature before a court of appeals for review unless notice of appeal 
is filed, within thirty days after the entry of such judgment, order or 
decree." 
16 The State's reasons for abandoning this suit are not articulated in the 
record. We have noted above, however, that, during the pendency of this 
case before the Court of Appeals, Illinois again amended its Abortion Law. 
1984 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 83-1128. At the time of the Court of Appeals' 
decision, which was based on the pre-amendment version of the Abortion 
Law, the amended sections were subject to a temporary restraining order. 
See Keith v. Daley, No. 84 C 5602 (ND Ill. 1984). The Court of Appeals 
declined to assess the constitutionality of the 1984 amendments and re-
jected challenges of mootness based on those amendments. Charles v. 
Daley, 749 F. 2d, at 455, 457-458. The State's inaction may well be due to 
its concern with the amended, not the earlier, form of the statutes under 
attack. 
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would be entitled to seek review, enabling him to file a brief 
on the merits, and to seek leave to argue orally. But this 
ability to ride "piggyback" on the State's undoubted standing 
exists only if the State is in fact an appellant before the 
Court; in the absence of the State in that capacity, there is no 
case for Diamond to join. 
IV 
A 
Diamond claims that his interests in enforcement permits 
him to defend the Abortion Law, despite Illinois' acquies-
cence in the Court of Appeals' ruling of unconstitutionality. 
This claim also must fail. D~amond J attempts to 
equate his position with that of appellees~ysicians who 
instituted this suit in the District Court. Appellees, how-
ever, had standing to bring suit against the state officials who 
were charged with enforcing the Abortion Law because ap-
pellees faced possible criminal prosecution. See, e. g., Doe 
v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 188 (1973). The conflict between 
state officials empowered to enforce a law and private parties 
subject to prosecution under that law is a classic "case" or 
"controversy" within the meaning of Art. III. 
The conflict presented by Diamond is different. Were the 
Abortion Law to be held constitutional, Diamond could not 
compel the State to enforce it against appellees because "a 
private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the 
prosecution or nonprosecution of another." Linda R. S. v. 
Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 619 (1973); see Leeke v. 
Timmerman, 454 U. S. 83 (1981); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 
-- U. S. -- (1984). See also Younger v. Harris, 401 
U. S. 37, 42 (1971); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 33 
(1962). Cf. Allen v. Wright,- U.S.-,- (slip op. 
16) (1984) ("an asserted right to have the Government act in 
accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to con-
fer jurisdiction on a federal court"). 
The concerns for state autonomy that deny private individ-
uals the right to compel a State to enforce its laws apply with 
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even greater force to an attempt by a private individual to 
compel a State to create and retain the legal framework 
within which individual enforcement decisions are made. 
The State's acquiescence in the Court of Appeals' determina-
tion of unconstitutionality serves to deprive the State of the 
power to prosecute anyone for violating the Abortion Law. 
Diamond's attempt to maintain the litigation is then simply 
an effort to compel the State to enact a code in accord with 
Diamond's interests. But "the power to create and enforce a 
legal code, both civil and criminal" is one of the quintessential 
functions of a State. Alfred L . Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto 
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U. S. 592, 601 (1982). Because the 
State alone is entitled to create a legal code, only the State 
has the kind of "direct stake" identified in Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U. S., at 740, in defending the standards embod-
ied in that code. 
B 
Even if there were circumstances in which a private party 
would have standing to defend the constitutionality of a chal-
lenged statute, 17 this is not one of them. Diamond is not able 
to assert an injury in fact. A physician has standing to chal-
lenge an abortion law that poses for him a threat of criminal 
prosecution. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S., at 188; see Planned 
Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 62 
(1976). In addition, a physician w~emonstrates that abor-
tion funding regulations have a direct financial impact on his 
practice may assert the constitutional rights of other individ-
uals who are unable to assert their rights themselves. See 
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 (1975). Diamond attempts 
to assert an equivalent interest based upon his personal sta-
tus as a doctor, a father, and a protector of the unborn. We 
17 The Illinois Legislature, of course, has the power to create new inter-
ests, the invasion of which may confer standing. In such a case, the re-
quirements of Art. III may be met. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Wel-
fare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41, n. 22 (1976). 
·' .. 
84-137~PINION 
DIAMOND v. CHARLES 11 
must reject Diamond's claims that his personal and profes-
sional interests confer standing. 
Diamond, who is a pediatrician, claims that if the Abortion 
Law were enforced, he would gain patients; fewer abortions 
would be performed and those that would be performed 
would result in more live births, because the law requires a 
physician to attempt to preserve the life of the aborted fetus. 
By implication, therefore, the pool of potential fee-paying pa-
tients would be enlarged. The possibilities that such fetuses 
would survive and then find their way as patients to Diamond 
are speculative, and "unadorned speculation will not suffice 
to invoke the federal judicial power." Simon v. Eastern 
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 44. Diamond's 
situation, based on speculation and hoped-for fees is far dif-
ferent from that of the respondent-physicians in Wulff, 
supra, where actual fees were limited by the challenged Mis-
souri statute. 
Diamond also alleges that, as a physician, he has standing 
to litigate the standards of medical practice that ought to be 
applied to the performance of abortions. Diamond's pur-
ported interest rests on § ll(a) of the Abortion Law, which 
provides that the requirements of that law constitute the 
standards of conduct for the medical profession. Since that 
provision is neither before the Court nor integrally related to 
any of the sections at issue in this proceeding, it cannot con-
fer standing on Diamond. Although Diamond's allegation 
may be cloaked in the nomenclature of a special professional 
interest, it is simply the expression of a desire that the Illi-
nois Abortion Law as written be obeyed. Article III re-
quires more than simply a desire to vindicate value interests. 
See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 687 (1973). It 
requires an "injury in fact" which distinguishes "a person 
with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation-even 
though small-from a person with a mere interest in the 
problem." ld., at 689, n. 14. Diamond has an interest, but 
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cern . . . does not substitute for the concrete injury required 
by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights 
Org., 426 U. S., at 40. Similarly, Diamond's claim of con-
scientious objection to abortion does not provide a judicially 
cognizable interest. 
Doctor Diamond also asserts that he has standing as the fa- ~ 
ther a daughter of childbearing years. First, to the ex-
tent that Diamond's c aim aerives from § 3(3) of the Abortion 
Law, the parental notification section, he lacks standing to 
continue this litigation, for it does not address the validity of 
that provision. Second, to the extent that he claims an in-
terest in ensuring that his daughter is not prescribed an 
abortifacient without prior information-a concern ostensibly 
triggered by the invalidation of §§ 2(10) and ll(d)-he has 
failed to show that he is a proper person to advance this claim 
I 
on her behalf. Diamond has not shown either that his 
daughter is currently a minor or that she is otherwise incapa-
ble of asserting her own rights. Diamond's failure to adduce 
factual support renders him incapable of maintaining this ap-
peal in his capacity as a parent. See Bender v. Williamsport 
Area School District, --U. S. --, -- (1986) (STEVENS, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (slip op. 13). 
Nor can Diamond assert the constitutional rights of the un-
born fetus. 18 The interest in protecting otentiallife belongs 
exclusively to the State. See ett v. a ey, 764 . 2d 1265, 
1271 TCK~enied (as to interlocutory review) sub 
nom. Illinois Pro-Life Coalition, Inc. v. Keith, -- U. S. 
-- (1985), ("it is the state alone who can assert an interest 
in the unborn"). Unly the -state may invoke regulatory 
mea~protect that interest and only the State may in-
18 Diamond claims that he is asserting the rights of his prospective pa-
tients, who survive abortion, to be born with as few handicapping condi-
tions as possible. Diamond asserted this claim before the District Court 
as a basis for being appointed guardian ad litem for unborn fetuses. That 
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voke the power of the courts when those regulatory meas-
ures are subject to challenge. 
v 
Finally, Diamond asserts that he has standing based on 
two interests that relate not to the Abortion Law, but to his 
involvement in this litigation. Neither interest suffices. 
A 
Diamond's status as an intervenor below, whether permis-
sive or as of right, does not confer standing sufficient to keep 
the case alive in the absence of the State on this appeal. Al-
though intervenors are considered parties entitled, among 
other things, to seek review by this Court, Mine Workers v. 
Eagle-Picher Co., 325 U. S. 335, 338 (1945), an intervenor's 
right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose 
side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing 
by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III. 
See id., at 339. See also Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U. S. 352, 
368 (1980). 
This Court has recognized that certain public concerns may 
constitute an adequate "interest" within the meaning of Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2), see Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. 
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U. S. 129, 135 (1967), and has 
held that an interest under Rule 24(a)(2), which provides for 
intervention as of right, 19 requires a "significantly protect-
able interest." See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 
517, 531 (1971). However, the precise relationship between 
the interest required to satisfy the Rule and the interest re-
quired to confer standing, has led to anomalous decisions in 
19 Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2) provides for intervention 
"(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or trans-
action which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the dispo-
sition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately repre-
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the Courts of Appeals. 20 We need not decide today whether 
a party seeking to intervene before a District Court must sat-
isfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the 
requirements of Art. III. To continue this suit in the ab-
sence of Illinois, Diamond himself must satisfy the require-
ments of Art. III. The interests Diamond asserted before 
the District Court in seeking to intervene plainly are insuffi-
cient to confer standing on him to continue this suit now. 
B 
At oral argument, Diamond stated that the District Court 
has assessed attorney's fees against him and the State, 
jointly and severally. This fee award, Diamond asserted, 
provided the requisite standing to litigate this case: 
"The standing or the real controversy thus between the 
parties to this case is a very real sum of money, a judg-
ment that runs in favor of the individual plaintiff physi-
cians in this case and against the individual defendants 
intervenors whom I represent." Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. 
Diamond is claiming that an award of fees entered after a de-
cision on the merits by the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals, and after probable jurisdiction had been noted by 
this Court, gives him a direct stake in the enforcement of the 
20 The Courts of Appeals have reached varying conclusions as to whether 
a party seeking to intervene as of right must himself possess standing. 
Compare United States v. 39.36 Acres of Land, 754 F. 2d 855, 859 (CA7 
1985), petn. for cert. pending sub nom. Save the Dunes Council, Inc. v. 
United States, No. 85-426 (intervention requires an interest in excess of 
that required for standing), with Southern Christian Leadership Confer-
ence v. Kelley, 241 U. S. App. D. C. 340, 747 F. 2d 777 (1984) (equating 
interest necessary to intervene with interests necessary to confer stand-
ing), and United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 206 U. S. App. D. C. 
317,642 F. 2d 1285 (1980) (intervention is proper only if the would-be inter-
venor has an interest in the outcome of the suit different from that of the 
public as a whole) with Sagebush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F. 2d 525 
(CA9 1983) (resolving intervention questions without reference to standing 
doctrine) and Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc . v. Citizens for Com-
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Illinois Abortion Law. In short, because Diamond stands to 
lose the amount of the fee unless the State's regulations con-
cerning abortion are reinstated, he claims he has been in-
jured by the invalidation of those regulations. 21 
But Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U. S., at 472, 
makes clear that Art. III standing requires an injury with a 
nexus to the substantive character of the statute or regula-
tion at issue: 
"[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the 
party who invokes the court's authority to 'show that he 
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury 
as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defend-
ant,' Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 
U. S. 91, 99 (1979), and that the injury 'fairly can be 
traced to the challenged action' and is likely to be re-
dressed by a favorable decision,' Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)." 
Any liability for fees is, of course, a consequence of Dia-
mond's decision to intervene, but it cannot fairly be traced to 
the Illinois Abortion Law. The fee award is wholly unre-
lated to the subject matter of the litigation, and bears no rela-
tion to the statute whose constitutionality is at issue here. 
It is true, that were the Court to resolve the case on the mer-
its against appellees, appellees would no longer be "prevail-
ing parties" entitled to an award of fees under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1988. But the mere fact that continued adjudication would 
21 While not detenninative of the standing claim in this case, Diamond 
responded to the fee award by filing a motion to dismiss him from the liti-
gation and name Americans United for Life, Inc., as the sole intervenor. 
See n. 6, supra. In the alternative, Diamond asked the District Court to 
clarify the original intervention order by stating that "AUL is an interven-
ing defendant for all purposes, including the assessment of attorney's 
fees." The motion further stated that "AUL is the real party in interest." 
In assessing fees against appellant Diamond, the District Court stated that 
"the State defendants and intervenors played at least equal roles in defend-
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provide a remedy for an injury that is only a byproduct of the 
suit itself does not mean that the injury is cognizable under 
Art. III. 
VI 
The State of Illinois, by failing to appeal, has indicated no 
direct interest in upholding the four sections of the Abortion 
Law at issue here. Diamond has stepped in, attempting to 
maintain the litigation abandoned by the State in which he re-
sides. Because he lacks any judicially cognizable interest in 
the Abortion Law, his appeal is dismissed for want of 
jurisdiction. 
It is so ordered. 
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~ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
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EUGENE F. DIAMOND AND JASPER F. WILLIAMS, 
APPELLANTS v. ALLAN G. CHARLES ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1986] 
JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Appellant Eugene F. Diamond is a pediatrician engaged in 
private practice in Illinois. He seeks to defend before this 
Court the constitutionality of four sections of the Illinois 
Abortion Law of 1975, as amended. 1 These sections impose 
criminal liability for the performance of an abortion under 
certain circumstances, and, under other circumstances, re-
quire that the woman be provided with particular abortion-
related information. The State of Illinois has chosen to ab-
sent itself from this appeal, despite the fact that its statute is 
at stake. Because a private party whose own conduct is nei-
ther implicated nor threatened by a criminal statute has no 
judicially cognizable interest in the statute's defense, we dis-
miss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 
I 
On October 30, 1979, over gubernatorial veto, the Illinois 
Legislature amended the State's 1975 abortion law to provide 
for increased regulation. 1979 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 81-1078. 
That very day appellees, four physicians who provide obstet-
' 1975 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 79-1126, as amended, now codified as Ill. Rev. 
Stat. ch. 38, ~~ 81-21 to 81-34 (1983). The 1975 Act was passed over the 
Governor's veto. Substantial portions of it already have been held to be 
unconstitutional. See, e. g., Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (ND Ill. 
1978), aff'd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F. 2d 193 (CA7 1979). 
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ric, gynecologic, and abortion services in Illinois, filed a class 
action in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois. They alleged a deprivation of rights in 
violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 by the Illinois officials charged 
with enforcing the Abortion Law. 2 Appellees sought de-
claratory and injunctive relief. 3 
The next day, the District Court certified the plaintiff class 
and temporarily restrained enforcement of the entire statute. 
On November 8, appellant Diamond filed a motion to inter-
vene as a party defendant, either permissively or as of right, 
and to be appointed guardian ad litem for fetuses who sur-
vive abortion. 4 The motion for intervention professed to be 
based on Doctor Diamond's conscientious objection to abor-
tions, and on his status as a pediatrician and as a parent of an 
unemancipated minor daughter. 5 
2 The defendants named in the complaint were the Attorney General of 
the State and the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Health, each 
in his official capacity, and the State's Attorney of Cook County, in both his 
official capacity and as representative of a class consisting of the State's 
Attorneys in all the counties of the State of Illinois. A suit against a state 
officer in his official capacity is, of course, a suit against the State. See 
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. --, -- (1985) (slip op. 6). The Dis-
trict Court certified a defendant class of State's Attorneys. Charles v. 
Carey, Civ. No. 79C 4541 (ND Ill., Oct. 31, 1979). 
3 On the same day another and similar action was filed in the same court 
by three other Illinois obstetrician-gynecologist s and two Illinois clinics 
that provide abortion services. The two suits were consolidated by court 
order on Nov. 14, 1979. 
' Doctor Diamond's Motion to Intervene and for Appointment of Guard-
ian was joined by Doctor Jasper F. Williams, and David K. Campbell. 
Doctor Williams, a physician engaged in private practice in Illinois, in the 
alternative sought appointment as guardian ad litem for unborn children 
subject to abortion. We are advised that Doctor Williams died on April 
15. 1985, after the filing of the notice of appeal to this Court. No one has 
been substituted for him. Mr. Campbell , who sought intervention as the 
spouse of a woman of childbearing age, did not file or join a notice of appeal 
to this Court. 
' Diamond claimed that under the Abortion Law as a whole fewer abor-
tions would he performed, and that those performed in accordance with the 
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Over appellees' objection, the District Court granted 
Diamond's motion to intervene. 6 The District Court did not 
indicate whether the intervention was permissive or as of 
right and it did not describe how Diamond's interests in the 
litigation satisfied the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 24 
for intervenor status. The court denied the guardianship 
motion. 
On November 16, the District Court entered a preliminary 
injunction against a number of sections of the Abortion Law, 
including §§ 6(1) and 6( 4). 7 These sections prescribe the 
standard of care that must be exercised by a physician in 
performing an abortion of a viable fetus, 8 and of a possibly 
Abortion Law would be designed to preserve the life of aborted fetuses, 
resulting in more live births. Diamond also rested his motion for interven-
tion on § 13 of the Abortion Law, which provides that a physician who 
refuses to perform abortions based on conscientious objections will not be 
subject to liability. He relied, furthermore, on § ll(a), to the effect that 
violations of the Abortion Law constitute unprofessional conduct, and on 
§ 3.3, which provides for parental consultation. 
6 Although the Motion to Intervene was on behalf of Doctor Diamond, 
Doctor Williams, and Mr. Campbell, see n. 4, supra, the District Court 
granted leave to intervene to Americans United for Life Legal Defense 
Fund, counsel for the intervenors below and for Diamond before this 
Court. 
7 The preliminary injunction also applied to the following sections: § 2(2) 
(defining "viability"); § 3.3 (parental consultation); § 3.4 (spousal consulta-
tion); § 3.5(2), in part (the portion requiring that the patient be told, inter 
alia, that "The State of Illinois wants you to know that in its view the child 
you are carrying is a living human being whose life should be preserved. 
Illinois strongly encourages you not to have an abortion but to go through 
to childbirth"); § 4 (abortion subsequent to first trimester); §§ 5(1), (2), and 
(3) (definition of "viability"); § 9 (prohibition of saline amniocentesis after 
first trimester); § 10(i) (certification as to nonviability or as to medical indi-
cators for abortion when fetus was viable); § 10(j) (reporting requirements 
for saline amniocentesis); § lO(l), in part (the reporting requirement as to 
the basis for a judgment concerning the existence of a medical emergency); 
and § 12, in part (the third sentence, prohibiting experimentation with or 
exploitation of fetal tissue). 
8 6(1) then provided: 
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viable fetus. 9 A violator of § 6(1) is subject to a term of 
imprisonment of between three and seven years and a fine 
not exceeding $10,000. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ~~ 1005-8-1(5) 
and 1005-9-1(1) (1983). A violator of § 6(4) is subject to a 
term of imprisonment of between two and five years and a 
fine not exceeding $10,000. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, 
~~ 1005-8-1(6) and 1005-9-1(1) (1983). 
"No person who intentionally terminates a pregnancy after the fetus is 
known to be viable shall intentionally fail to exercise that degree of profes-
sional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus 
which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the 
life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted. Any phy-
sician or person assisting in such a pregnancy termination who shall inten-
tionally fail to take such measures to encourage or to sustain the life of a 
fetus known to be viable before or after birth commits a Class 2 felony if 
the death of a viable fetus or infant results from such failure." Ill. Rev. 
Stat., ch. 38, ~ 81-26 (1983). 
On June 30, 1984, the Illinois Legislature amended § 6(1), overriding an-
other veto of the Governor. 1984 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 83-1128, § 1. The 
Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of § 6(1) as it appeared 
prior to the 1984 amendment. See Charles v. Daley, 749 F. 2d 452, 455 
(CA7 1984). 
9 Section 6(4) then provided: 
"No person who intentionally terminates a pregnancy shall intentionally 
fail to exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to pre-
serve the life and health of the fetus which such person would be required 
to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to 
be born and not aborted when there exists, in the medical judgn1ent of the 
physician performing the pregnancy termination based on the particular 
facts of the case before him, a possibility known to him of sustained sur-
vival of the fetus apart from the body of the mother, with or without artifi-
cial support. Any physician or person assisting in such pregnancy termi-
nation who shall intentionally fail to take such measures to encourage or 
sustain the life of such a fetus, before or after birth, is guilty of a Class 3 
felony if the death of a viable fetus or an infant results from such failure." 
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ~ 81-26 (1983). 
Section 6(4) was amended by the 1984 statute cited inn. 8, supra, but the 
Court of Appeals assessed its constitutionality on the version quoted 
above. See Charles v. Daley, 749 F. 2d, at 455. 
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The plaintiffs appealed the denial of the preliminary injunc-
tion as to § 2(10), which defines the term "abortifacient," 10 
and as to § ll(d), which requires a physician who prescribes 
an abortifacient to tell the patient what it is. 11 A violator of 
§ ll(d) is subject to a term of imprisonment of not more than 
30 days, and a fine not exceeding $500. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 
38, ~~ 1005-8-3(1) and 1005-9-1(3) (1983). No cross-appeal 
was taken. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in-
structed the District Court to enter a preliminary injunction 
as to §§ 2(10) and ll(d), because these statutory provisions 
forced physicians "to act as the mouthpiece for the State's 
theory of life." Charles v. Carey, 627 F. 2d 772, 789 (1980). 12 
On remand, the District Court permanently enjoined, 
among others, §§ 6(4), 2(10), and ll(d). Charles v. Carey, 
579 F. Supp. 464 (ND Ill. 1983). 13 On appeal and cross-
10 Section 2(10) provides: 
"'Abortifacient' means any instrument, medicine, drug, or any other 
substance or device which is known to cause fetal death when employed in 
the usual and customary use for which it is manufactured, whether or not 
the fetus is known to exist when such substance or device is employed." 
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ~ 81-22 (1983). 
11 Section ll(d) provides in relevant part: 
"Any person who prescribes or administers any instrument, medicine, 
drug or other substance or device, which he knows to be an abortifacient, 
and which is in fact an abortifacient, and intentionally, knowingly or reck-
lessly fails to inform the person for whom it is prescribed or upon whom it 
is administered that it is an abortifacient commits a Class C misdemeanor." 
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ~ 81-31 (1983). 
12 The Court of Appeals instructed the District Court also to enter 
a preliminary injunction against the following sections: § 3.2(A)(l)(a)(iii); 
§ 3.5(2); § 6(6); § 3.2(A)(1)(a) (defining the terms "by the physician who is to 
perform the abortion" and "the woman is provided at least 24 hours before 
the abortion"); § 3.2(A)(1)(b) (defining the term "from the physician at least 
24 hours before the abortion is to be performed"); § 3.2(B)(1) (waiver of 
waiting period); § 10(k) (reporting requirement for waiver of the waiting 
period);§ 3.2(A)(1)(a) (defining the term "with a true copy of her pregnancy 
test results"); and § 6(2). See 627 F. 2d, at 792, and n. 36. 
13 Other sections of the Abortion Law had been preliminarily enjoined 
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appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the entry of the perma-
nent injunction as to the three sections, and also permanently 
enjoined §6(1). 749 F. 2d 452 (CA7 1984). The State did 
not appeal the grant of the permanent injunction. Diamond, 
however, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and a jurisdic-
tional statement. As we have indicated, see n. 4, supra, 
Doctor Diamond is the sole appellant here. We noted proba-
ble jurisdiction. 471 U. S. -- (1985). 
The State, through the office of its Attorney General, sub-
sequently filed with this Court a "letter of interest," invoking 
our Rule 10.4, which provides: "All parties to the proceeding 
in the court from whose judgment the appeal is being taken 
shall be deemed parties in this Court . . . . " In that letter 
Illinois stated: 
"Although not an appellant, the Office of the Attorney 
General ... is a party in the United States Supreme 
Court and is designated an appellee. The Illinois Attor-
ney General's interest in this proceeding is identical to 
that advanced by it in the lower courts and is essentially 
co-terminous with the position on the issues set forth by 
the appellants." Letter dated July 15, 1985, to the 
Clerk of the Court from the Director of Advocacy, Office 
of the Attorney General of Illinois. See App. to Reply 
Brief for Appellants A-1. 
Illinois' absence as an appellant requires that we examine our 
jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. 
II 
Article III of the Constitution limits the power of federal 
courts to deciding "cases" and "controversies." This re-
quirement ensures the presence of the "concrete adverseness 
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the 
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitu-
under a separate opinion by the District Court following remand. See 
Charles v. Carey, 579 F. Supp. 377 (ND Ill. 1983). 
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tional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). 
The presence of a disagreement, however sharp and acrimo-
nious it may be, is insufficient by itself to meet Art. III's re-
quirements. This Court consistently has required, in addi-
tion, that the party seeking judicial resolution of a dispute 
"show that he personally has suffered some actual or threat-
ened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of 
the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 
441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 
490, 501 (1975). 
The nature of the injury is central to the Art. III inquiry, 
because standing also reflects a due regard for the autonomy 
of those most likely to be affected by a judicial decision. 
"The exercise of judicial power ... can so profoundly affect 
the lives, liberty, and property of those to whom it extends," 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, 454 U. S. 464, 473 (1982), 
that the decision to seek review must be placed "in the hands 
of those who have a direct stake in the outcome." Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 (1972). It is not to be 
placed in the hands of "concerned bystanders," who will use it 
simply as a "vehicle for the vindication of value interests." 
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 687 (1973). 
III 
Had the State of Illinois invoked this Court's appellate ju-
risdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2) and sought review of 
the Court of Appeals' decision, the "case" or "controversy" 
requirement would have been met, for a State has standing 
to defend the constitutionality of its statute. Diamond 
argues that Illinois' "letter of interest" demonstrates the 
State's continued concern with the enforcement of its Abor-
tion Law, and renders the State the functional equivalent 
of an appellant. Accordingly, Diamond asserts, there is no 
jurisdictional problem in the case. This claim must be 
rejected. 
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It is true that, as a party below, the State remains a party 
here under our Rule 10.4. 14 But status as a "party" does not 
equate with status as an appellant. To appear before the 
Court as an appellant, a party must file a notice of appeal, the 
statutory prerequisite to invoking this Court's jurisdiction. 
See 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c). 15 Illinois' mere expression of in-
terest is insufficient to bring the State into the suit as an ap-
pellant. By not appealing the judgment below, the State in-
dicated its acceptance of that decision, and its lack of interest 
in defending its own statute. 16 The State's general interest 
may be adverse to the interests of appellees, but its failure to 
invoke our jurisdiction leaves the Court without a "case" or 
"controversy" between appellees and the State of Illinois. 
Cf. Princeton University v. Schmid, 455 U. S. 100 (1982). 
"The purpose of the Rule is to provide a means for a party below, who 
was not notified that this Court's review has been sought by another party, 
to make its interests known to the Court. Frequently, an appellant would 
seek review as to only one party below, permitting the judgment to stand 
as to others. See R. Stern, E. Gressman & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court 
Practice, § 6-20 (6th ed. 1986), and § 6.35 (3d ed. 1962) (describing evolu-
tion of the Rule). This Court's Rule 10.4 therefore avoids the adjudication 
of rights in a party's absence, but it does not provide a means to obtain 
review when there has been no filing by that party of a notice of appeal. 
15 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c) provides: "Any other appeal or any writ of certio-
rari intended to bring any judgment before the Supreme Court for review 
shall be taken or applied for within ninety days after the entry of such 
judgment or decree." 
16 The State's reasons for abandoning this suit are not articulated in the 
record. We have noted above, however, that, during the pendency of this 
case before the Court of Appeals, Illinois again amended its Abortion Law. 
1984 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 83-1128. At the time of the Court of Appeals' 
decision, which was based on the pre-amendment version of the Abortion 
Law, the amended sections were subject to a temporary restraining order. 
See Keith v. Daley, No. 84 C 5602 (ND Ill. 1984). The Court of Appeals 
declined to assess the constitutionality of the 1984 amendments and re-
jected challenges of mootness based on those amendments. Charles v. 
Daley, 749 F. 2d, at 455, 457-458. The State's inaction may well be due to 
its concern with the amended, not the earlier, form of the statutes under 
attack. 
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Had the State sought review, this Court's Rule 10.4 makes 
clear that Diamond, as an intervening defendant below, also 
would be entitled to seek review, enabling him to file a brief 
on the merits, and to seek leave to argue orally. But this 
ability to ride "piggyback" on the State's undoubted standing 
exists only if the State is in fact an appellant before the 
Court; in the absence of the State in that capacity, there is no 
case for Diamond to join. 
IV 
A 
Diamond claims that his interests in enforcement permit 
him to defend the Abortion Law, despite Illinois' acquies-
cence in the Court of Appeals' ruling of unconstitutionality. 
This claim also must fail. Doctor Diamond attempts to 
equate his position with that of appellees, the physicians who 
instituted this suit in the District Court. Appellees, how-
ever, had standing to bring suit against the state officials who 
were charged with enforcing the Abortion Law because ap-
pellees faced possible criminal prosecution. See, e. g., Doe 
v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 188 (1973). The conflict between 
state officials empowered to enforce a law and private parties 
subject to prosecution under that law is a classic "case" or 
"controversy" within the meaning of Art. Ill. 
The conflict presented by Diamond is different. Were the 
Abortion Law to be held constitutional, Diamond could not 
compel the State to enforce it against appellees because "a 
private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the 
prosecution or nonprosecution of another." Linda R. S. v. 
Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 619 (1973); see Leeke v. 
Timmerman, 454 U. S. 83 (1981); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 
467 U. S. 883 (1984). See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 
37, 42 (1971); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 33 (1962). 
Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. -,-(slip op. 16) (1984) 
("an asserted right to have the Government act in accordance 
with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdic-
tion on a federal court"). 
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The concerns for state autonomy that deny private individ-
uals the right to compel a State to enforce its laws apply with 
even greater force to an attempt by a private individual to 
compel a State to create and retain the legal framework 
within which individual enforcement decisions are made. 
The State's acquiescence in the Court of Appeals' determina-
tion of unconstitutionality serves to deprive the State of the 
power to prosecute anyone for violating the Abortion Law. 
Diamond's attempt to maintain the litigation is, then, simply 
an effort to compel the State to enact a code in accord with 
Diamond's interests. But "the power to create and enforce a 
legal code, both civil and criminal" is one of the quintessential 
functions of a State. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto 
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U. S. 592, 601 (1982). Because the 
State alone is entitled to create a legal code, only the State 
has the kind of "direct stake" identified in Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U. S., at 740, in defending the standards embod-
ied in that code. 
B 
Even if there were circumstances in which a private party 
would have standing to defend the constitutionality of a chal-
lenged statute, 17 this is not one of them. Diamond is not able 
to assert an injury in fact. A physician has standing to chal-
lenge an abortion law that poses for him a threat of criminal 
prosecution. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S., at 188; see Planned 
Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 62 
(1976). In addition, a physician who demonstrates that abor-
tion funding regulations have a direct financial impact on his 
practice may assert the constitutional rights of other individ-
uals who are unable to assert those rights themselves. See 
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 (1975). Diamond attempts 
to assert an equivalent interest based upon his personal sta-
17 The Illinois Legislature, of course, has the power to create new 
interests, the invasion of which may confer standing. In such a case, the 
requirements of Art. III may be met. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare R ights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41, n. 22 (1976). 
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tus as a doctor, a father, and a protector of the unborn. We 
must reject Diamond's claims that his personal and profes-
sional interests confer standing. 
Diamond, who is a pediatrician, claims that if the Abortion 
Law were enforced, he would gain patients; fewer abortions 
would be performed and those that would be performed 
would result in more live births, because the law requires a 
physician to attempt to preserve the life of the aborted fetus. 
By implication, therefore, the pool of potential fee-paying pa-
tients would be enlarged. The possibilities that such fetuses 
would survive and then find their way as patients to Diamond 
are speculative, and "unadorned speculation will not suffice 
to invoke the federal judicial power." Simon v. Eastern 
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 44. Diamond's 
situation, based on speculation and hoped-for fees is far dif-
ferent from that of the physicians in Wulff, supra, where ac-
tual fees were limited by the challenged Missouri statute. 
Diamond also alleges that, as a physician, he has standing 
to litigate the standards of medical practice that ought to be 
applied to the performance of abortions. 18 Although Dia-
mond's allegation may be cloaked in the nomenclature of a 
special professional interest, it is simply the expression of a 
desire that the Illinois Abortion Law as written be obeyed. 
Article III requires more than simply a desire to vindicate 
value interests. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 
669, 687 (1973). It requires an "injury in fact" that 
distinguishes "a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a 
litigation-even though small-from a person with a mere in-
terest in the problem." I d., at 689, n. 14. Diamond has an 
interest, but no direct stake, in the abortion process. This 
"abstract concern . . . does not substitute for the concrete in-
' 8 Diamond's purported interest appears to rest~(a) of the Abor-
tion Law, which provides that the requirements of that law constitute the 
standards of conduct for the medical profession. Since that provision is 
neither before the Court nor integrally related to any of the sections at 
issue in this proceeding, it cannot confer standing on Diamond. 
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jury required by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 40. Similarly, Diamond's 
claim of conscientious objection to abortion does not provide a 
judicially cognizable interest. 
Doctor Diamond also asserts that he has standing as the fa-
ther of a daughter of childbearing years. First, to the ex-
tent that Diamond's claim derives from § 3(3) of the Abortion 
Law, the parental notification section, he lacks standing to 
continue this litigation, for it does not address the validity of 
that provision. Second, to the extent that he claims an in-
terest in ensuring that his daughter is not prescribed an 
abortifacient without prior information-a concern ostensibly 
triggered by the invalidation of §§ 2(10) and ll(d)-he has 
failed to show that he is a proper person to advance this claim 
on her behalf. Diamond has not shown either that his 
daughter is currently a minor or that she is otherwise incapa-
ble of asserting her own rights. Diamond's failure to adduce 
factual support renders him incapable of maintaining this ap-
peal in his capacity as a parent. See Bender v. Williamsport 
Area School Dist.,- U. S. -, -- (1986) (slip op. 14). 
Nor can Diamond assert any constitutional rights of the un-
born fetus. 19 Only the State may invoke regulatory meas-
ures to protect that interest and only the State may invoke 
the power of the courts when those regulatory measures are 
subject to challenge. 
v 
Finally, Diamond asserts that he has standing based on 
two interests that relate not to the Abortion Law, but to his 
involvement in this litigation. Neither interest suffices. 
19 Diamond claims that he is asserting the rights of his prospective pa-
tients, who survive abortion, to be born with as few handicapping condi-
tions as possible. Diamond asserted this claim before the District Court 
as a basis for appointment as guardian ad litem for unborn fetuses. That 
claim was rejected by the District Court. 
t.. 
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A 
Diamond's status as an intervenor below, whether permis-
sive or as of right, does not confer standing sufficient to keep 
the case alive in the absence of the State on this appeal. Al-
though intervenors are considered parties entitled, among 
other things, to seek review by this Court, Mine Workers v. 
Eagle-Picher Co., 325 U. S. 335, 338 (1945), an intervenor's 
right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose 
side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing 
by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III. 
See id., at 339. See also Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U. S. 352, 
368 (1980). 
This Court has recognized that certain public concerns may 
constitute an adequate "interest" within the meaning of Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2), see Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. 
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U. S. 129, 135 (1967), and has 
held that an interest under Rule 24(a)(2), which provides for 
intervention as of right, 20 requires a "significantly protect-
able interest." See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 
517, 531 (1971). However, the precise relationship between 
the interest required to satisfy the Rule and the interest re-
quired to confer standing, has led to anomalous decisions in 
the Courts of Appeals. 21 We need not decide today whether 
20 Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2) provides for intervention 
"(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or trans-
action which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the dispo-
sition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately repre-
sented by existing parties." 
21 The Courts of Appeals have reached varying conclusions as to whether 
a party seeking to intervene as of right must himself possess standing. 
Compare United States v. 39 . .16 Acres of Land, 754 F. 2d 855, 859 (CA7 
1985), petn. for cert. pending sub nom. Save the Dunes Council, Inc. v. 
United States, No. 85-426 (intervention requires an interest in excess of 
that required for standing), with Southern Christian Leadership Confer-
ence v. Kelley , 241 U. S. App. D. C. 340, 747 F. 2d 777 (1984) (equating 
interest necessary to intervene with interests necessary to confer stand-
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a party seeking to intervene before a District Court must sat-
isfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the 
requirements of Art. III. To continue this suit in the ab-
sence of Illinois, Diamond himself must satisfy the require-
ments of Art. III. The interests Diamond asserted before 
the District Court in seeking to intervene plainly are insuffi-
cient to confer standing on him to continue this suit now. 
B 
At oral argument, Diamond stated that the District Court 
has assessed attorney's fees against him and the State, 
· jointly and severally. This fee award, Diamond asserted, 
provided the requisite standing to litigate this case: 
"The standing or the real controversy thus between the 
parties to this case is a very real sum of money, a judg-
ment that runs in favor of the individual plaintiff physi-
cians in this case and against the individual defendants 
intervenors whom I represent." Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. 
Diamond is claiming that an award of fees entered after a de-
cision on the merits by the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals, and after probable jurisdiction had been noted by 
this Court, gives him a direct stake in the enforcement of the 
Illinois Abortion Law. In short, because Diamond stands to 
lose the amount of the fee unless the State's regulations con-
cerning abortion are reinstated, he claims he has been in-
jured by the invalidation of those regulations. 22 
ing), and United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 206 U. S. App. D. C. 
317, 642 F. 2d 1285 (1980) (intervention is proper only if the would-be inter-
venor has an interest in the outcome of the suit different from that of the 
public as a whole) with Sagebush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F. 2d 525 
(CA9 1983) (resolving intervention questions without reference to standing 
doctrine) and Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc. v. Citizens for Com-
munity Action, 558 F. 2d 861 (CA8 1977) (same). 
22 While not determinative of the standing claim in this case, Diamond 
responded to the fee award by filing a motion to dismiss him from the liti-
gation and name Americans United for Life, Inc., as the sole intervenor. 
See n. 6, supra. In the alternative, Diamond asked the District Court to 
\'I' 
84-1379-0PINION 
DIAMOND v. CHARLES 
But Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U. S., at 472, 
makes clear that Art. III standing requires an injury with a 
nexus to the substantive character of the statute or regula-
tion at issue: 
"[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the 
party who invokes the court's authority to 'show that he 
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury 
as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defend-
ant,' Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 
U. S. 91, 99 (1979), and that the injury 'fairly can be 
traced to the challenged action' and is likely to be re-
dressed by a favorable decision,' Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)." 
Any liability for fees is, of course, a consequence of Dia-
mond's decision to intervene, but it cannot fairly be traced to 
the Illinois Abortion Law. The fee award is wholly unre-
lated to the subject matter of the litigation, and bears no rela-
tion to the statute whose constitutionality is at issue here. 
It is true that, were the Court to resolve the case on the mer-
its against appellees, appellees would no longer be "prevail-
ing parties" entitled to an award of fees under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1988. But the mere fact that continued adjudication would 
provide a remedy for an injury that is only a byproduct of the 
suit itself does not mean that the injury is cognizable under 
Art. III. 
VI 
The State of Illinois, by failing to appeal, has indicated no 
direct interest in upholding the four sections of the Abortion 
Law at issue here. Diamond has stepped in, attempting to 
clarify the original intervention order by stating that "A UL is an interven-
ing defendant for all purposes, including the assessment of attorney's 
fees." The motion further stated that "AUL is the real party in interest." 
In assessing fees against appellant Diamond, the District Court stated that 
"the State defendants and intervenors played at least equal roles in defend-
ing the abortion statute." Charles v. Daley, No. 79-C-4541 (ND Ill. Apr. 
22, 1985). 
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maintain the litigation abandoned by the State in which he 
resides. Because he lacks any judicially cognizable interest 
in the Abortion Law, his appeal is dismissed for want of 
jurisdiction. 
It is so ordered. 
CH AM BERS OF 
.:itqtrtmt <!Jtturl ttf tltt ~tb .itzdt.tr 
~~. ~. <!J. 21l~~~ 
JUSTI C E B Y RON R . WH ITE 
April 15, 1986 
j 
84-1379 - Diamond and Williams v. Charles 
Dear Harry, 
Please note at the foot of your opinion 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.i'n:prtnu QI01trl qf tlft ~tb .i'tahg 
.. ulfinghm. ~. <!f. 20~'!~ 
April 16, 1986 
Re: No. 84-1379 Diamond v. Charles 
Dear Sandra, 
Please join me in your opinion concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment. 
Sincerely, ~ 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
CH-BI!:RS 01'" 
THE CHIEF" ,JUSTICE 
.Jltpl"nnt C!Jouri of tltt 'Jnittb .Jtatt• 
'Jluftin~ J. <If. 20~"~ 
April 24, 1986 
Re: No. 84-1379 - D·iarnond v. Charles 
Dear Sandra, 
I join your draft of April 16, 1986. 
Justice O'Connor ~ 
Copies to the Conference 
', ~ 
l''l 
~--· --------- --~·--· ---------------------------
-----~ --1»? - ··:;;- ~ . ..___. __ _ 
/ 
I •·· 
84-1379 Diamond v. Charles (Cabell) 
'· 
HAB for the Court 11/20/85 
1st draft 2/14/86 
2nd draft 3/13/86 
3rd draft 4/25/86 




SOC concurring in part and concurring 
1st draft 4/10/86 
2nd draft 4/16/86 
3rd draft 4/25/86 
Joined by WHR 4/16/86 
CJ 4/24/86 
BRW concurs in the judgment 4/15/86 
SOC will write separately 2/25/86 
in the judgment 
.. 
~ 
